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E x p e r t  O p i n i o n
use it to select and screen manuscript submissions, and
funding agencies use it to award research funds. The goal
is to get authors to meet their discipline’s standards and
thus achieve scientific objectivity. Publications and awards
that haven’t undergone peer review are often regarded with
suspicion by scholars and professionals in many fields.
However, peer review, although universally used, has many
drawbacks.
We propose replacing peer review with an auction-based
approach: the better the submitted paper, the more scientific
currency the author will likely bid to have it published. If the
bid correctly reflects the paper’s quality, the author will be
rewarded in this new scientific currency; otherwise, the
author will lose this currency. We argue that citations are an
appropriate currency for all scientists.1 We believe that cita-
tion auctions will encourage scientists to better control their
submissions’ quality. It will likely also inspire them to pre-
pare more exciting talks for accepted papers and to invite
discussion of their results at congresses and conferences and
among their colleagues. In the long run, citation auctions
could have the power to greatly improve scientific research.
Peer review’s drawbacks
While some believe that passing peer review is a certi-
ficate of validity, others are far more skeptical. One of the
most common complaints is that peer review is slow: a sub-
mitted paper typically takes several months, or even years
in some fields, to appear in print. Such a delay in a fast-
growing field is devastating for the propagation of ideas and
needs a solution. Another major drawback is its cost in
terms of hours of volunteer work devoted to refereeing.
In addition, some sociologists of science argue that peer
review makes publication susceptible to control by elites
and to personal jealousy. Peer review might suppress dis-
sent against “mainstream” theories. Reviewers tend to be
especially critical of conclusions that contradict their own
views but happily accept those that accord with them. At
the same time, elite scientists are more likely than less
established ones to be sought as referees, particularly by
high-prestige journals or publishers. As a result, some
argue, ideas that harmonize with the elite’s views are more
likely to be published and to appear in premier journals
than iconoclastic or revolutionary ideas. Consequently, the
whole process obstructs and delays the emergence of new
ideas and scientific revolutions.
However, others have pointed out that scientists have
many journals in which to publish, making control of
information difficult. In addition, peer review’s decision-
making process, in which each referee gives an opinion
separately without consulting others, is intended to miti-
gate some of these problems. Nevertheless, this process
still doesn’t address the cost of peer reviewing and publi-
cation delays.
Moreover, peer review tends to accept those weaker
papers that have a mix of prestigious and unknown au-
thors. This is because referees typically trust a paper with
prestigious authors even if they don’t fully understand its
contributions, believing that “this must be true, must be
good, and the final submission will address any potential
drawbacks.” This might not systematically be bad, but
there are more elegant ways to give opportunities to new
authors. For the sake of improving the quality of science,
this trust in important coauthors should be reduced. Blind
peer review, one possible way to deal with this problem, is
still an imperfect solution because it doesn’t decrease the
cost of reviewing or publication delays.
Citations and their auctions
According to Philip G. Altbach, director of Boston Col-
lege’s Center for International Higher Education, the cita-
tion system was invented mainly to understand how scien-
tific discoveries and innovations are communicated and
how research functions.2 On the basis of our research on
the innovative use of auctions,3,4 in May 2006 we consid-
ered using this approach to create an alternative to peer
review.5,6 Conferences often suffer from low participation
The scientific community has been suffering frompeer review for decades. This process (also called
refereeing) subjects an author’s scientific work or ideas to
the scrutiny of one or more experts in the field. Publishers 
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and little discussion of the presented papers,
because authors focus on getting their papers
to the conference rather than widely dissem-
inating their results. Moreover, organizers
extend extraordinary effort selecting the best
conference paper, thus creating a heavy ref-
ereeing workload. To avoid these pitfalls, we
propose an auction system combining cita-
tion’s predictive value with authors’ intimate
knowledge of their papers. (For other alter-
natives to peer review, see the sidebar.)
We can characterize the situation as fol-
lows. Nowadays, a scientist wants to pub-
lish his or her results in conferences and
journals to gain citations and reputation. As
evidenced by the acceptance rates, highly
ranked and read conferences and journals
select only a small number of submitted
papers—hopefully, those that will generate
the most citations. In our approach, confer-
ences and journals hold an auction to select
those papers whose authors have bid the
highest. Each bid represents an author’s pre-
diction of how many citations that paper will
receive. To make this bid trustworthy, we
consider the number of citations an author
has received for previously published papers
as that author’s citations wallet—the amount
of “cash” the author possesses. So, the num-
ber of citations in authors’wallets limits their
bids, and every auction-winning paper with-
draws a number of citations from its authors’
wallets.
So, what should the wallet contain? Cita-
tions from one conference that has accepted
a paper by the author? Citations from a
group of related conferences? Citations of
all the author’s papers? We use the citations
from either a group of conferences or all the
author’s papers. This lets an author collect
citations in weaker conferences to get into
stronger ones or into a journal. Conse-
quently, rational authors will bid the high-
est number of citations they think accep-
tance will require, but to the limit of their
wallet’s cash (that is, their past perfor-
mance). Authors might lose cash if their
winning bid exceeds the number of cita-
tions the paper will generate. Conversely,
they might win more cash if the published
paper generates more citations than they
bid. An author’s ultimate goal will be to
keep his or her wallet growing.
Our approach has two main benefits. First,
it reduces refereeing costs because paper
selection via a citation auction doesn’t need
prior understanding of the paper’s content to
evaluate its quality. Second, authors will be
much more committed to their papers’qual-
ity. They will also focus much more on wide
dissemination and detailed explanations of
their papers to maximize the number of cita-
tions. In short, this novel approach empha-
sizes active promotion of ideas while reduc-
ing peer review’s high expense.
We’re fully aware that making this idea
workable involves challenges. Here we dis-
cuss the three most important ones.
First, if each author receives credit for all
citations to the paper, we’ll have wallet in-
flation. A paper with five authors, five cita-
tions, and a bid of five citations will contri-
bute 25 citations total to all the authors’
wallets, but the payment will be just five
citations from one author’s wallet. To avoid
the inflation, each citation will earn one
unit of credit for the paper, regardless of
the number of its authors. Additionally,
we’ll assign fractions of each citation to the
individual authors according to their “cita-
tions contract.” This contract might reflect
the percentage of each author’s participa-
tion. If no citations contract exists, all cita-
tions will be assigned to the first author,
who will then decide how to share them. To
encourage collaborations, we also let all
the paper’s authors contribute their cita-
tions to a joint bid. This will solve the in-
flation problem. Coauthors are often stu-
dents, so they can build their wallets for a
future independent career while working
with their advisors on their theses.
The second challenge involves self-
references. An author could safely bid a
number of citations equal to the number
of that author’s self-citations in the paper.
After the paper’s publication, the author
would automatically receive the credit for
the citations, immediately rebuilding the
wallet. To avoid this effect, none of the
self-citations or citations of papers by a
bid’s contributors should be added to the
author’s wallet.
The third challenge regards the wallet’s
initial content. We assume that the initial
content is zero citations. So, new authors
(for example, graduate students) or au-
thors who depleted their wallets via too-
aggressive bidding wouldn’t even be able
to try to get their papers published. To
avoid such situations, a certain fraction of
papers should undergo peer review, but
with much higher acceptance criteria. This
will also avoid the problem of the bound-
ary-quality papers, which are difficult and
time consuming to evaluate.
Alternatively, authors could receive
“sponsorship.” For example, when one such
author looks for credit, another researcher
might loan some citations from his or her
wallet (likely after the paper’s review and
after the lender has suggested improve-
ments). For a supervisor or advisor, the
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2007 www.computer.org/intelligent 17
In some fields, such as astronomy, much of the communica-
tion about new results no longer takes place through peer-
reviewed papers but through preprints submitted to electronic
servers such as arXiv.org.
The recently launched online journal Philica (www.philica.
com) exemplifies one new way to redress many of peer re-
view’s problems. Unlike a traditional journal, it immediately
publishes all submitted papers; review takes place after-
wards. Reviews are still anonymous, but instead of an editor
choosing the reviewers, any researcher who wishes to can
review an article. Reviews appear at the end of each paper,
thus giving the reader criticism or guidance about the paper
instead of determining whether it’s published. This means
that reviewers can’t suppress ideas with which they disagree.
Some authors (for example, Stefano Mizzaro1) suggest scor-
ing papers and authors, letting readers act directly as referees,
and receiving feedback on whether the readers provided
good-quality judgments. So, good readers would earn good
reputations.
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motivation for a loan is clear: lending part
of the prestige represented by the citations
in his or her wallet is a kind of investment.
Hopefully, the student will eventually re-
turn the citations, perhaps with extra cita-
tions as interest, which an agreement be-
tween the two could formalize. We don’t
believe that this approach would benefit
“bad students with famous supervisors”
over “good students with unknown super-
visors.” That’s because a donor system
based on one scientist’s rational criteria
Table 1. A simulation of four citation auction strategies.*
No. of citations
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Author and paper Bid Earned Bid Earned Bid Earned Bid Earned Bid Earned Bid Earned
Author 1 (aggressive)
Author 1’s wallet 13 13 13 8 7 7
Paper 1
Paper 2 0
Paper 3 0 6 1
Paper 4 4 3
Paper 5 1 1
Author 2 (cautious)
Author 2’s wallet 0 6 7 7 5 3
2
Paper 1 (loan) 8
1
Paper 2 (loan) 1
Paper 3 2 3
Paper 4 1 1
Paper 5 2 2
Paper 6 1 1
Paper 7 1 0
Paper 8 1 0
Paper 9 1 0
Paper 10 1 0
Author 3 (very cautious)
Author 3’s wallet 0 1 1 2 2 1
1
Paper 1 (loan) 3
1
Paper 2 (loan) 0
Paper 3 0 1 0
2
Paper 4 (loan) 4
Paper 5 1 1
Paper 6 1 0
Author 4 (no risk)
Author 4’s wallet 0 0 0 0 0 2
1
Paper 1 0 0 (loan) 1 0
1
Paper 2 (loan) 3
* Blue squares indicate unsuccessful bids.
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should be more efficient than bureaucratic
systems based on collectives of scientists
who have reached a consensus of what’s
good or bad. Finally, even unrelated re-
searchers might want to invest their cita-
tions in a paper by a promising young tal-
ent for a profit of future citations.
It’s beyond this article’s scope to discuss
the citation auction diffusion and promo-
tion mechanism, which requires deep in-
sight into the auction model.3 Clearly, we’ll
need a new economic model derived from
the citation auction to foresee how auctions
increase the quality of research, decrease
peer review costs and publication time, and
so on.
A hypothetical case
Table 1 represents a possible scenario
with a simulation of four researchers using
different auction strategies (aggressive, cau-
tious, very cautious, and avoiding all risk).
The Bid column indicates an author’s bid;
blue squares indicate unsuccessful bids. The
Earned column indicates the number of cita-
tions received by each paper published via
the auction. For each year in which a paper
was published, the Earned column shows
the number of citations that as of May 2006
were made to that paper (to increase realism,
we used actual data from a group of confer-
ences). For simplicity, we use a first-price
sealed-bid auction, where every author sub-
mits in a closed envelope a bid stating how
many citations he or she is offering. This bid
supposes to be lower than the number of ci-
tations the author will collect after the paper’s
publication. Some authors who couldn’t bid
higher than 0 because their citation wallets
were empty borrowed citations from col-
leagues and paid back the loans from the
citation earnings.
To measure papers’ impact, we can ex-
amine several rankings of authors. The first
is the citation wallet ranking, based on how
many citations remain in an author’s wallet
after an auction. In this scenario, author 1
clearly leads with seven citations, followed
by author 2 with three citations, author 4
with two, and author 3 with one. The wallet
values are lower than the total number of
citations for each author, which leads to
another ranking (author 1, author 2, author
3, and author 4). However, the citation wal-
let ranking has the advantage of reflecting
the actual number of citations (not just the
number of expected citations) that the en-
tire set of publications has generated for an
author in a given time period. This ranking
can track the behavior along a scientist’s
career, unlike the H-index,7 which just pro-
vides a cumulative analysis of the scientist’s
best publications. So, these two measure
different things. If an author’s papers are
ranked in descending order of their num-
bers of citations, the H-rank is the largest
rank that is smaller than the number of ci-
tations that the corresponding paper has.
Hence, the H-index tries to capture the im-
pact of the key papers throughout a scien-
tist’s history. Citation wallet ranking tries
to catch the impact of all the scientist’s
publications, which could be equal to the
H-index in the case of outstanding sci-
entists but will differ for other scientists
(most of us). Table 2 compares several
rankings, including the H-index.
Table 2 also shows the outcome compared
to expectations from the auctions shown in
table 1. The Earned Citations and Total Pro-
ductivity columns accurately measure the
accepted papers’ quality. So, authors have
incentive to gain the maximum number of
citations, at least as many as they invested
in the bid. Moreover, this system is self-
regulating. If an author repeatedly under-
performs in citations (the author’s papers
receive fewer citations than what he or she
bid), the author’s wallet will eventually ap-
proach zero. This might happen even to pro-
ductive authors, such as author 1 in table 2,
whose bid productivity is negative although
the citation productivity is quite high. Such
authors will have difficulty assuring the pub-
lication of their papers, because they will
lose many auctions. Conversely, authors can
quickly increase their wallet’s size by sub-
mitting papers that will be highly cited, thus
making it easy to publish papers in the fu-
ture. Although the wallets of the most con-
servative strategies tend to grow, the other
strategies might oscillate. This effect clearly
differs from existing citation measures,
which always grow through time.
Making citation auctions usable will in-
volve many steps. The most important are to
• create a proof-of-concept of citation auc-
tions, using a few selected publications;
• explore the most appropriate auction
mechanisms;
• develop the technology for a citation
bank using standard citation engines; and
• study the use of “taxes” for stabilizing
the resulting economic model.
The adoption of citation auctions might
take decades. However, the increased effi-
ciency of scientific activities arising from
their use should let them prevail over the
less efficient peer review.
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Table 2. Author rankings generated by classic measures, the H-index, and citation auctions.
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